Refereed International Journals

1. Simplex representation of Insurance Performance Analysis (with Sai Ranjani), 2020, Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier Vol. 42, page 419-436.
2. Political pricing of Electricity: Can it go with universal provision, (with Muralee Krishnan), 2018, Energy Policy, Elsevier, Vol. 116, page 371-381.
3. Voting Paradoxes in Indian Elections, Quality and Quantity, Springer Publishers, 2012, Vol. 46, page 949-958. (ABDC B category)
4. Political Accountability and Fiscal Federalism, International Tax and Public Finance, 2001, Springer Publishers, page Vol. 8, page 263-279.
5. Productivity, Technical and Allocative Efficiency and Farm Size in Wheat Farming in India: A DEA Approach, (with Raghbendra Jha and Puneet Chitkara), Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis, 2000.

Refereed Indian Journals

1. “Adapting Teaching to Include Diversity and for transition to Online Teaching” Management and Labour Studies 2022, page 1-16
2. “Evolution of Electricity Prices” (with Muralee Krishnan) (2017), Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. L11, No. 19.
3. “Were District Choices of NFFWP Appropriate?” Journal of the Indan School of Political Economy, 2006, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, page 641-648.

Government Reports

1. Lead a Project for the 15^th Finance Commission of India for the State of Jharkhand, titled with Abhishek Charaborty, Suma Damodaran and Cledwyn Fernandez, “Outcome Evaluation of State Finances in the context of recommendations of the 14^th Finance Commission: Determination of a sustainable debt roadmap for 2020-2025, taking into account impact of introduction of GST and other tax/non-tax trend forecasts”. The link for the final report is https://fincomindia.nic.in/writereaddata/html_en_files/fincom15/StudyReports/11.pdf

Papers in edited books

1. Political Institutions, Distortions and Regional Disparities, in Development, displacement and disparity: India in the last quarter of the twentieth century, ed. by Nirmala Banerjee and Sugata Marjit, Orient Longman, 2005.
2. Some notes on Principal of Central Transfers (with Raghbendra Jha and Mukesh Anand), in Contemporary Challenges: Issues before the 11^th Finance Commission, NIPFP, New Delhi, 1999.
3. Public and Private Investment expenditure and its linkages with FDI: A case study of India (with Sadanand Tutakne and Pradeep Apte) in Indian Economic Reforms, ed. by Raghbendra Jha, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
4. Extending the Coverage of Social Protection among informal workers in India, in Strengthening Social Protection in East Asia, edited by Mukul G. Asher and Fukunari Kimura, Routledge-ERIA Studies in Development Economics, 2015.

Working papers

1. "Local public goods in a democracy: Theory and evidence from rural India," ASARC Working Papers 2006-06, Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre
2. On the allocation of public goods to villages in India, Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics, Working paper #10, 2003.
3. On the nature of markets for the poor in urban locations, Working Paper Series on Agriculture and the Poor, No. 24, July 2004, Bazaar Chintan, IDE, India.

1. Political Institutions, Distortions and Regional Disparities, in Development, displacement and disparity: India in the last quarter of the twentieth century, ed. by Nirmala Banerjee and Sugata Marjit, Orient Longman, 2005.
2. Some notes on Principal of Central Transfers (with Raghbendra Jha and Mukesh Anand), in Contemporary Challenges: Issues before the 11th Finance Commission, NIPFP, New Delhi, 1999.
3. Public and Private Investment expenditure and its linkages with FDI: A case study of India (with Sadanand Tutakne and Pradeep Apte) in Indian Economic Reforms, ed. by Raghbendra Jha, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
4. Extending the Coverage of Social Protection among informal workers in India, in Strengthening Social Protection in East Asia, edited by Mukul G. Asher and Fukunari Kimura, Routledge-ERIA Studies in Development Economics, 2015.

1. National Workshop: Public Economics: Theory and Policy, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, January 8-9, 2016, paper titled, Democracy and Redistribution presented.
2. Silver Jubilee conference on Contemporary Issues in Development Economics, Jadavpur University, December 22-23, 2015, paper titled, Democracy and Redistribution
3. European Public Choice Society Meeting, 2008, Jena, Germany, paper titled, Job Reservations and Policy Choices, presented.
4. First World Public Choice Society Meeting, Amsterdam, March 2007, paper titled Local Public Goods in a Democracy: Theory and Evidence from Rural India, presented.
5. Third World Bank Conference on Inequality, Washington D.C, June 2006, paper titled Are jurisdictions with the median voter and median inequality favored: presented.
6. Second annual conference on Economic Growth and Development, ISI Delhi 2005, paper titled, Job reservations and policy choices presented.

1. "Local public goods in a democracy: Theory and evidence from rural India," ASARC Working Papers 2006-06, Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre
2. On the allocation of public goods to villages in India, Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics, Working paper #10, 2003.
3. On the nature of markets for the poor in urban locations, Working Paper Series on Agriculture and the Poor, No. 24, July 2004, Bazaar Chintan, IDE, India.

Work in progress

1. When are boycotts successful? Evidence from South Asia: We look into instances of success of boycott call during religious riots in the state of Gujarat in India, and try and look into the possibility that riots took place since calls for economic boycott failed. We also look into possibilities of success of an election or poll boycott which is quite common in South Asia, and we are of the opinion that such boycott calls will be successful if the credibility of the elected government is at stake and a parallel government is in operation and powerful.
2. Democracy and Redistribution, (with Raghbendra Jha). Democratic governments should typically favor a majority of jurisdictions with the least expectations since that is what would maximize their probability of winning in an election. Individuals realizing this would strategically choose their expectations, if they demand too little from the government, they end up getting less; if they demand too much, they may be neglected completely at the expense of others. Our results show that when individuals have different incomes, it is the richest and the median income citizens who win in the process and tax resources are equally distributed between them. We investigate the efficiency and the equity impact of a uniform tax rate, a two tier tax structure and a three tier tax structure, in a situation where the government uses all tax resources for public goods, as well as in a situation where it siphons off a bit of it for its own welfare.
3. Effect of job reservation on career choices. We investigate the impact of job reservations for disadvantaged sections of the population on group incomes in a model where people have to undergo training in order to apply for a job in the formal sector. Training costs are higher for the disadvantaged group than for the general group so the former will undergo training only if the probability of getting a formal sector job is very high. Introduction of job reservations for the disadvantaged fails to increase group income for the disadvantaged when number of jobs is low. Increased group incomes for them are accompanied by losses from applicants who apply for he formal sector joand fail to get through. Only when the number of jobs is very high, does reservation amount to a transfer of income from eral to the disadvantaged group.

1. Member of International Institute of Public Finance Congress, IIPF.